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Abstract
This paper argues that though the GCC, as a regional organisation, has been
seen as a symbol of unity in this volatile region, the present crisis seems to
have reached a status-quo that challenges the very unity of the organisation.
This paper also argues that though there are still possibilities that diplomacy
may succeed in bringing the neighbours to work in unison like before, post
Qatar- blockade, the unity of the organisation will be a little shaky and will
not revert back exactly to how it was before.
Introduction
On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain along with Egypt
announced that they were cutting off ties with their neighbour Qatar. They alleged
that Qatar had ties with several terrorist organisations, was financing and
harbouring terrorists and extremist groups as well as terrorist individuals in
Qatar, which had culminated in their taking such a drastic action. Qatar’s growing
ties with Iran had also been perceived by these countries as a threat to the security
of their region. They further alleged that Qatar was using its satellite television
network, Al Jazeera as a propaganda tool to delegitimize other countries in the
region. Qatar rejected all these allegations as ‘baseless’ and stated that such
behaviour by its neighbours is an infringement on its sovereignty and a violation
of international law.
The resulting situation has created a tension in the region and challenged
the unity of the organisation of the six member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
which had comprised of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman.
The subsequent actions and statements of leaders from both sides further
exacerbated the geopolitical situation in the Gulf region. In the past too, there
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have been several instances of differences emerging among the members of the
GCC, but all have always been resolved amicably through negotiation and
dialogue. But the present crisis seems to be more than a family feud among the
Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms and is turning out to be an existential challenge for the
GCC as the small cracks in the unity of the organisation are now widening into
chasms of much larger proportions.
GCC as a Symbol of Unity
The GCC was formed in 1981 with the aim of bringing the Gulf sheikhdoms
together to ward off any outside threat and cultivate deeper political, economic,
cultural ties among themselves. The similar nature of political and economic
systems further motivated them to forge ties amongst themselves and remain
united. The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 which brought Ayatollah
Khomeini to power challenged the Gulf monarchies. The Monarchies thus joined
hands together to fight against any potential political, ideological and security
challenges emanating from an ideologically motivated, Shia-majority Iran. The
solid relationships and unity among the royal families was an important aspect
for the formation of the GCC which in turn shaped the security and strategic
environment in the Gulf region. Over the decades, the GCC has emerged as a
strong regional organisation in the otherwise unstable West Asia.
In the economic field, GCC has witnessed a number of successes and
milestones. A GCC Customs Union was introduced in 2003. They also signed a
GCC common market in 2008 to encourage cross-border investments amongst
themselves. In 2009, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait proposed formation of a
GCC Monetary Council which would ultimately result in adopting a single GCC
currency which, however has not been fructified so far. Their growing economies
primarily by dint of the vast oil and gas reserves in their countries made them a
powerful economic bloc not only in the region but also in the world. A number
of countries came forward to sign free trade agreements with the GCC and their
huge energy reserves have been the primary bargaining chip for them.
Their shared concerns about the regional security in the Gulf made them
join hands together. The concern of a growing Iran with a nuclear programme
was a common binding factor for the GCC member states. The GCC has a
Peninsula Shield Force – a military force comprising of militaries of all the six
GCC countries to defend the member countries from external aggression. The
GCC defence planning council coordinates the militaries of the member
countries.
Politically, the GCC has remained a unified bloc though differences have
persisted among the member countries over a number of issues. The GCC
243
countries have remained allies of the USA and the latter has military forces
deployed in all the GCC states since the Gulf War in 1991. Iran has been perceived
as a common adversary for both the GCC and US. In recent years, the GCC has
interacted with all the major powers of the world and also with a large number
of countries from Europe, Asia and Africa and Latin America.
Arab Unrest and Differences within the GCC
The Blockade of Qatar is not an isolated incident in the geopolitics of the
Gulf region. It is the result of an accumulation of allegations against Qatar and
the refusal on the latter’s part to comply with the expectations and demands of
the Saudi-led group. The blockade is a deliberate attempt on the part of the
Saudi led group to punish Qatar for not confirming to their views on regional
security. Tension has been simmering between Qatar and its neighbours since
the beginning of the popular unrest in the Arab world. The subsequent regional
geopolitics and their competing national interests further widened the gap.
Consequently, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have emerged as the two main actors in
this geopolitical game.
Arab Spring changed the geopolitical and security situation in the region,
which made the Gulf sheikhdoms cautious not only to save their regimes but
also protect their national interests in the fluid security environment. Aggressive
pursuit of foreign policy objectives, uncompromisingly safeguarding their own
national interests and the intense desire to play a role in the regional politics
have driven the countries to take such stubborn positions.
Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia are politically proactive and economically
influential not only in the Gulf region but also in the wider West Asian and
North African region. They have used their political and economic clout to
shape the course of popular protests in West Asia and North Africa. Their
competing interests have led to clash of interests on several occasions. A major
clash of interest between the two broke out in Egypt in the aftermath of the
overthrow of Hosni Mubarak from power. Muslim Brotherhood led by Mohamed
Morsi came to power in Egypt in 2012. This came as an advantage for Qatar as
it has always maintained strong ties with the organisation and it engages with
some of the top leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, it
came as a challenge for Riyadh as it had cultivated strong ties with the Mubarak
regime and had a chequered history of relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Similarly, in Syria, though both Saudi Arabia and Qatar support the Syrian
opposition coalition, they supported different factions of the opposition due to
ideological differences. Riyadh reportedly supports the Salafist elements in the
Syrian opposition while Qatar supports a wide spectrum of the opposition but
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primarily the Muslim Brotherhood.1 Saudi Arabia was not an active player in
Libya though it supported harsh measures against the Muammar Gaddafi regime.
Qatar was not only vocal against Gaddafi, it also supplied weapons to the Libyan
opposition forces fighting against the Gaddafi regime.2 Such proactive Qatari
role in the regional developments certainly did not go down well with Saudi
Arabia.
Since the establishment of the GCC, Saudi Arabia has been the most
dominant player in the organisation. It has to a large extent determined the
agenda and vision of the organisation. Saudi Arabia’s frayed relationship with
Iran has been one of the important determinants of its regional policy. The GCC’s
position against Iran over regional issues is well known and Riyadh has
articulated its anti-Iran stance repeatedly at various international platforms. Since
the Arab unrest began, Saudi Arabia has been further infuriated with the active
Iranian involvement in other regional issues such as in Syria, Yemen, Iraq,
Hezbollah, and Hamas among others. It, thus, expects a hardliner anti-Iran stance
from its GCC neighbours. The smaller Sheikhdoms of the GCC, over the years,
have adopted their own independent foreign policies, which sometimes have
gone against the wishes and interests of Riyadh. For instance, countries like
Oman and Qatar have established ties with Iran showing their independence in
making decisions in their own regional policies. Oman played an important
role in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between
Iran and the P5+1. Similarly, there have been differences among them over
other regional issues such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, developments
in Egypt, Syria, and so on. Riyadh, apparently, has not been able to accept this
fact, resulting in the emergence of differences within the organisation. Riyadh’s
acceptance of its smaller neighbours playing a determining role in the affairs of
the region and beyond, would to a large extent, determine the unity of the GCC
as an organisation. Accumulation of differences over a number of geopolitical
and security related issues over the years have created these cracks among the
Gulf Sheikhdoms.
Conflicting Perceptions
Amidst all these allegations and counter-allegations, both the sides have
justified their actions. The Saudi led group has based its arguments on the core
concerns of regional security, and countering the threat of terrorism. Anchoring
their arguments in the need to stop support to terrorism and its financing, they
have put forth their image as champions against terrorism and have called
themselves the Anti-Terror Quartet (ATQ). The Saudi-led bloc has accused Qatar
of supporting terror and extremist groups in the region. The group believes that
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Qatar’s alleged support for Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Taliban and other
extremist groups represents immense security challenges for the region. Saudi
leaders have stated that Qatar needs a course correction in its regional and foreign
policy and must return to the mainstream. This was reflected in Saudi Foreign
Minister Adel Al Jubeir’s statement, where he said that, “Nobody wants to hurt
Qatar. It has to choose whether it must move in one direction or another
direction.”3 He also added that, “We want to see Qatar implement the promises
it made a few years back with regard to its support of extremist groups, (and in)
regard to its hostile media and interference in affairs of other countries.”4
Similarly, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash said “We
have reached a cul-de-sac in terms of trying to convince Qatar to change course.
Qatar’s ‘fingerprints are all over the place’ in terror funding. Enough is enough.”5
Qatar, on the other hand, anchors its arguments on the norms of sovereignty
as an accepted principle of international law, diplomacy and relations among
nations. For Qatar, the blockade and the subsequent list of demands by the
Saudi-led group is a violation of principle of sovereignty and international law.
While rejecting all the allegations of supporting terror and extremist groups
Qatar’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani alleged
that the neighbours of Qatar are “demanding that we have to surrender our
sovereignty” which is something it would never do.6 He also stated that “Qatar
continues to call for dialogue, despite the violation of international laws and
regulations, and that it is a clear aggression and an insult to all international
treaties, bodies and jurisdictions.”7 He further clarified that Qatar “never
compromised collective security of the region” and stated that his blockading
neighbours are guilty of “extraordinary, unprovoked and hostile actions.”8
In July 2017, the Saudi-led group sent a list of 13 demands to Qatar to
comply thus leading to further aggravation of the conflict. The demands, among
others, included severing ties with the terrorist organisations, scaling down ties
with Iran, closing the Turkish military base in Qatar, shut down Al Jazeera and
its affiliates and to cease contact with the political opposition in their countries.9
They also added that complying with their demands is a precondition for any
future negotiations with Qatar. Such demands by the Saudi-led bloc is reflective
of their obstinacy vis-a-vis Qatar. Such an inflexible approach towards their
neighbour has made the situation even more protracted and convoluted.
Qatar dismissed these demands and alleged that the demands are “meant to
infringe the sovereignty of the state of Qatar, shut the freedom of speech and
impose auditing and probation mechanism for Qatar.”10 Facing such massive
isolation by its neighbours, Qatar has fallen back on the sovereignty norm as a
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prime determinant of its approach towards the issue. While it supports dialogue
and negotiation to ease the tension and reach any acceptable solution, it has
maintained that its national sovereignty is not negotiable. Thus, by putting the
principle of sovereignty at the forefront of its defence, Qatar has not only played
it safe but also found a legitimate and acceptable position for itself to show its
political righteousness and expediency to the world. Emir Sheikh Hamad strongly
announced that Qatar’s sovereignty is red line for Qatar.11
Neutrality and Mediation by Kuwait and Oman
So far Kuwait and Oman have been mediating to diffuse the tension in the
aftermath of the blockade. Kuwait and Oman do not have any issues with Doha’s
foreign policy which has irritated the Saudi-led bloc. Kuwait and Oman have
also maintained neutrality in the Saudi-Iran conflict except the issues which are
agreed upon in GCC as a collective. Caught between two stronger and wealthier
neighbours, these two smaller countries have the herculean task of persuading
them to come to the negotiating table. Immediately after the Saudi-led block
announced to cut off their ties with Qatar, Kuwaiti Emir Sabah Al Ahmad Al
Jaber Al Sabah visited Riyadh and Doha. He reportedly carried a list of demands
from Riyadh to Doha. Though Kuwait immediately joined the mediation, it has
not been successful till now. Kuwaiti Emir has made trips to Riyadh and Doha,
and has carried messages from both sides for each other. Though both sides
have accepted Kuwait as a mediator, they have been using Kuwait to pass on
their messages to the other party rather than expressing their desire to sit on the
negotiate table to resolve the deadlock. Despite Kuwait’s best efforts, there is
still no direct communication established between Saudi Arabia and Qatar –
the major parties in the conflict. The mediation by Qatari emir has not been
able to bring the conflicting parties together, but it has certainly prevented the
conflict from escalating further.
Like Kuwait, Oman also does not want to get involved in the regional
conflicts involving its neighbours. Oman, in the past, has helped to bring Iran to
the negotiating table and playing a role in the signing of the JCPOA. It has also
attempted mediation in Syria and Yemen though without much success. Omani
ruler Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said is the only surviving leader of the GCC
who was present during the formation of the GCC in 1981.12 So it has been his
endeavour to keep the organisation united and to bring a political solution to
the conflict among its members without any further damage to the unity among
the Gulf monarchies.
Ironically, the two main actors in this conflict – Saudi Arabia and Qatar –
have mediated in a number of conflicts throughout the region in the past. They
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have used mediation as a foreign policy tool to enhance their image and prestige
in the Arab world and beyond. But in the present turn of events, the regional
mediators who earned respect for bringing warring parties to the negotiating
table have locked horns between themselves. Thus, what is required in the current
situation is an adept mediator who can bring both the countries to the negotiating
table.
Evolving Regional Geopolitics
In the aftermath of the announcement of the blockade, Iran was the first
country to seize the opportunity by extending cooperation to Qatar. On the face
of the blockade, Iran’s support came both as a political support as well as a
foreign policy tool in the hands of Qatar. Iran supplied essential commodities
such as food and medicines to Qatar immediately. In June 2017, Iran claimed
that the volume of its exports to Qatar was over 1,100 tonnes of food to Qatar
every day.13 Iran also allowed Qatar to use its airspace. While Iran has called for
a negotiated settlement of the crisis, it certainly seems to be the largest beneficiary
of the unfolding situation. The situation serves Iran’s geopolitical interests.
Besides, conflict between the countries of the GCC adds to Iran’s strategic
advantage in the region. Saudi Arabia has, in the past, always used the GCC as
a unified bloc portraying it as a Sunni dominated organisation against the Shia
majority in Iran. Saudi Arabia intends to keep Iran off the political, security and
strategic affairs of the Gulf region. But isolating Qatar has pushed it in further
proximity to Iran. Qatar’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman
Al Thani stated that by adopting strong measures against Qatar, the Saudi-led
group is giving Iran, “Qatar, like a gift”.14
Bahrain too, has stood firmly with Saudi Arabia in isolating Qatar. Expressing
the need to bring Qatar on the right track, Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh
Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa stated that the blockade would ‘continue as long
as it takes’15 for Doha to mend its ways. At the same time Bahrain is concerned
about the growing Iranian influence in the region and the growing warmth in
Iran-Qatar relationship in the aftermath of the announcement of the blockade.
Thus, while Bahrain wants Doha to fall in line by mending its policies and
wants to penalise Qatar for its policies, at the same time, it also wants to keep
Iran away from becoming a close ally to Qatar and interfering in the regional
politics of the Arab Gulf. Their traditional perception towards Iran propels
them to think that Iran is “a rogue power that can bring destruction to this
neighbourhood.”16
With the growing hostility exhibited from its Arab neighbours, Qatar has
changed its approach towards working with Iran. Disregarding pressure from
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the blockading countries, Qatar has restored its diplomatic relations with Iran
in August 2017. Qatar along with other GCC countries had originally recalled
their envoys from Iran in January 2016 when an angry mob had ransacked the
Saudi consulate in Mashhad in Iran, in reaction to the execution of the prominent
Saudi Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr Al Nimr by the Saudi authorities. Qatar’s decision
to fully restore the diplomatic ties with Tehran shows the Qatari determination
of going in its own way without succumbing to the pressures from its GCC
neighbours. Furthermore, the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
visited Doha in October 2017, and met with Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim Bin
Hamad Al Thani. After the meeting, Sheikh Tamim stated that Qatar is
comfortable with its ties with Iran.17 Thus, Doha’s defiance has further infuriated
the blockading quartet. The behaviour of the blockading countries as well as
Qatar shows that the unity of the GCC could be sacrificed for their own national
security and strategic interests.
Similarly, Turkey’s open support for Qatar has redrawn the lines of
geopolitical alliances in the Gulf region. Turkey condemned the Saudi-led
blockade of Qatar terming it as “inhuman and against Islamic values” and added
that “its as if a death penalty decision has been taken for Qatar”.18 On the other
hand, Turkey sent its military to aid Qatar as per an earlier agreement between
both the countries. Both Turkey and Qatar are engaged in talks since last several
years over their defence and military cooperation. Turkey and Qatar signed a
defence industry cooperation agreement in 2007, and a military training
agreement in 2012. Further in 2014, both agreed for the establishment of a
Turkish military base in Qatar. In April 2016, Turkey and Qatar signed a military
accord in Doha among others, comprising of deployment of the Turkish military
forces in Qatar.19 After the announcement of blockade by the Saudi-led bloc on
June 5, 2017, the Turkish parliament quickly approved the legislation of Turkish
troop deployment in Qatar. Both the countries have supported the protests in
Egypt against the Mubarak regime and have condemned the military coup staged
by Sisi which overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government led by Mohamed
Morsi. Both these countries have maintained close ties with the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Hamas which are banned by the other countries. A horrid
ideological battle is also reflected in the Turkish decision to side with Qatar.
Turkey and Qatar have strong links with the leadership of the Muslim
Brotherhood while Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt consider it as a
terrorist group. Notably, both Turkey and Qatar are the main backers of the
Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian theatre.
The crisis has brought Iran and Turkey on the same side of this geopolitical
battle. Iran and Turkey have remained ‘uneasy neighbours’20 for decades with a
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few periodic instances of cooperation between them. Any developments at the
regional level have often impacted the bilateral relationship between the two.
While in the recent past Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been
critical of Iran’s role in the region stating that “there is Persian nationalism in
the Middle East…we have to counter these efforts,”21 he now finds Iran on the
same side, staunchly supporting Qatar. The relationship between Turkey and
Iran had been adversely affected since the beginning of the ‘Arab Spring’ and
both countries had found themselves at opposite ends in the conflicts in Syria
and Iraq. But now, both the countries have come together in support of Qatar
after its blockade. This provides another opportunity for both these countries to
join hands together. If this happens, the geopolitics of the West Asian region
would undergo a tectonic change with Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side and
the Saudi-led group on the other.
The US Factor
The US is the most powerful external player in the Gulf region, and has
substantial influence over the Gulf Sheikhdoms. It has strong ties with all the
members of the GCC. Soon after the announcement of the blockade, President
Trump in a series of tweets supported the action of the Saudi led group and
alleged that Qatar was supporting terrorism in the region. President Trump’s
immediate reaction of this nature to the blockade of Qatar was both alarming
and atypical of the US approaches towards the GCC so far. Traditionally, the
US has maintained a cordial and balanced approach towards the members of
the GCC as it has significant interests in all the GCC countries which include
huge military deployments in all the GCC countries. The Obama administration
engaged with the GCC as a collective, while at the same time maintaining strong
ties with the individual countries. During the Obama administration, forums
such as the US-GCC strategic cooperation forum and a US-GCC security
committee were formed. Obama engaged with the GCC as a collective bloc to
fight against terrorism and particularly they had joined hands together to fight
the ISIS.
But under the Trump administration, it seems as if Saudi Arabia and UAE
have emerged as the two new favourites over the other GCC members. While
President Trump’s initial remarks showed his biases against Qatar, other
statements coming out of his officials were more moderate and reflective of the
continuing US policies towards the GCC. Trump has now toned down his
approach and expressed his interest to mediate in the conflict. US Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson has made trips to the Gulf and appealed for a political solution
to the conflict. Tillerson during his visit to Doha in October 2017 stated that the
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GCC is “most effective when it is unified” and expressed support from the US
for the mediation efforts by the Kuwaiti Emir.22 The approach of the US towards
the conflict would play a crucial role and could impact the unity among the
GCC member states.
Future of GCC Unity
The tussle within the GCC is not a completely new phenomenon. Several
differences had emerged within the organisation in the past too and the differences
had been addressed with negotiations and dialogue and resolved. But this time,
the isolation of Qatar by the Saudi-led group was a bit too much. Both sides are
sticking to their stands, and as a result the conflict has aggravated and continues
to linger. The regional geopolitics has also unfolded with new regional alliances
and thus a shift in the balance of power in the Gulf region. The idea of Gulf
unity has been challenged as the major Gulf countries have been divided over
most of the crucial issues of security and regional cooperation. The fault lines
of conflict and cooperation in the Gulf region seem to be oscillating like a
pendulum. With the mediation efforts of Kuwait and Oman, the countries of the
region may eventually succeed to strike a deal among themselves. But the unity
among the Gulf Sheikhdoms will not regain the same footing as before. Too
much bad blood has been spilled between the countries, especially between
Qatar on one hand, and Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain on the other. This will
have long term repercussions for unity among the GCC members.
Bahrain and the UAE have remained Saudi allies and in the present situation
their commitment to Saudi Arabia remains undiluted. Their interests in the
politics and security of the Gulf region are converging. In the GCC, Bahrain has
remained a trusted ally of Saudi Arabia. Both the royal families enjoy a strong
bonding and have similar perceptions over a number of crucial regional issues.
The Bahraini authorities were able to control the protests because of the timely
Saudi help under the Gulf Peninsula Shield Force. Bahrain was the first country
to blatantly announce that it will not participate in any meetings of the GCC
where Qatar is present. Further, targeting Qatar, Bahrain has imposed visa
requirements for the Qatari nationals.23 Though Bahrain has cited its national
security and safety as reasons for taking such a decision, its larger intention to
further isolate and harass Qatar is not invisible. Since decades, the GCC countries
have maintained a visa free entry for their nationals in all the GCC countries.
This has been a symbol of the existing unity and trust among the members of
the GCC for decades. Bahrain’s decision in this regard will have a negative
impact on its ties with Qatar, further widening the rift. Moreover, Bahraini
Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Al Khalifa went to the extent of
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saying that Qatar’s membership from the six-member GCC should be suspended.
He argued that suspending Qatar from the GCC is the right step to preserve the
organisation.24 The anger in Manama can also be gauged from the fact that
Bahrain is being pressurised into filing a complaint against Qatar at the UN and
the International Criminal Court (ICC) for interfering in its internal affairs by
supporting terrorism and extremist forces, and supporting anti-government forces
against the government in Bahrain.25
Similarly, the UAE has enjoyed a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia in
this region. Both these countries have shared interests in major regional, political,
and security issues. The UAE has been a key player in the decision to isolate
Qatar. A major triggering factor for the announcement was a leaked email of the
UAE envoy to US, Yousef Al Otaiba, revealing that, UAE, in collaboration
with the Washington DC based think tank Foundation for the Defence of
Democracies, was planning to organise a conference, focusing on Qatar’s
destructive role in the region and its support for the terrorist organisations and
individuals. This generated a lot of negative emotions in Doha. UAE has also
been critical of Qatar’s restoration of full diplomatic ties with Iran and has
urged Doha to cease its support for terrorist and extremist groups.26
While Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain are trying their best to isolate Qatar,
the latter on the other hand, is defying the blockade imposed by its neighbours.
Two other GCC members - Kuwait and Oman – have maintained studied
neutrality over the issue. Both these countries have chosen to mediate and ease
the tension by bringing their neighbours to the negotiating table. In the on-
going turbulence in the Gulf region these two countries represent a saner and
more moderate voice. Thus, the situation is currently moving from bad to worse
because of the inflexible approach of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar;
and the unsuccessful mediation attempts by their neighbours Kuwait and Oman.
Such a prolonged stalemate situation can only have a colossal effect on the
future unity of the GCC as a regional organisation.
Conclusion
The present crisis is reshaping the regional geopolitics in the Gulf region
and it will have a severe impact on the unity of the GCC. Though the GCC has,
in the past, witnessed several internal disputes among the member states, never
have such differences appeared as destructive for the unity of the organisation,
as the situation is unfolding now. While the GCC is undergoing a rough patch,
the future unity of the organisation is a large question mark now. The stubbornness
in the statements of the leaders, their respective sanctimonious positions, and
their unwillingness to talk has resulted in a status-quo in the GCC. Iran and
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Turkey – the two non-Arab players have emerged as decisive role players in the
Gulf region. In the present situation, when Qatar remains isolated from its
neighbours, it has found friends in Iran and Turkey who have offered political,
diplomatic and economic support to deal with the situation. Both Iran and Turkey
have found this as an ideal opportunity to spread their tentacles in the regional
politics of the Gulf. This also changes the geopolitical situation in the Gulf
region, especially in terms of the balance of power between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. The entry of Iran and Turkey as potential players in the Gulf, further
infuriates the ‘blockading quartet’ and dampens any attempt of restoring unity
among the GCC member states. Oman and Kuwait have maintained neutrality
and distanced themselves from the conflict. Thus, the emerging fault lines in
the regional geopolitics in the Gulf region seems to be in all likelihood, a ‘divided
GCC’ with Qatar, Iran and Turkey joining hands together vis-a-vis the
‘blockading quartet’. Mediation attempts have also not paid off till now.
The unfolding situation looks depressing for the future of the relationship
among the Gulf monarchies who had set an example of unity and integration of
the politics, economy and security in the form of the GCC. The crisis is,
ostensibly, going beyond a family feud in the tribal monarchical system of
governance in Arabia and is threatening the unity among the GCC monarchies.
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